

STATINTL !

Approved For Release 2002/05/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040005-7

Calendar No. 745

91ST CONGRESS }
2d Session }

SENATE }

REPORT
No. 749

**RESOLUTION REGARDING SUSPENSION OF FURTHER
DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE NU-
CLEAR STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS**

MARCH 24, 1970.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following

REPORT

(To accompany S. Res. 211)

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred a resolution (S. Res. 211) expressing the sense of the Senate concerning strategic arms limitations, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the resolution, as amended, be passed.

PURPOSE

There are two resolving clauses to Senate Resolution 211, as amended. The first states that it is the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations be urgently pursued between the Governments of the United States and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to seek agreed limitations of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This purpose is consistent with article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons which binds the United States and Soviet Governments "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. . . ." The second resolving clause expresses the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States should propose to the Soviet Government an immediate suspension by the United States and the Soviet Union of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

The full text of Senate Resolution 211, as reported, follows:

Whereas the competition to develop and deploy strategic weapons has reached a new and dangerous phase, which threatens to frustrate attempts at negotiating significant arms limitations and to weaken the stability of nuclear deterrence as a barrier to war; and

Whereas development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles by both the United States and the Soviet Union represents a fundamental and radical challenge to such stability; and

Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over strategic forces appears likely to diminish greatly if testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles proceed; and

Whereas a suspension of flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles promises to forestall deployment of such provocative weapons; and

Whereas a suspension of such tests could contribute substantially to the success of the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to seek agreed limitations of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons should be urgently pursued; and

Resolved further, That the President of the United States of America should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

COMMITTEE ACTION

Senate Resolution 211 was introduced by Senator Edward W. Brooke and 39 cosponsors on June 17, 1969. Three additional Senators joined as cosponsors subsequently.

The resolution as originally introduced expressed the sense of the Senate that the President should propose to the Soviet Government an immediate suspension by both countries of flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as appropriate, and also that the Government of the United States should declare its intention to refrain from additional flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles as long as the Soviet Union also refrained. The original resolution was referred to the State Department on June 18, 1969, with a request for executive branch comments.

The Department of State replied on June 24, in a letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to the chairman. The State Department reply stated that the executive branch was in accord with the resolution in supporting the desirability of starting talks with the Soviets on the subject of limitations on strategic weapons and went on to note that preparation for these talks was underway. The letter called attention to President Nixon's statement at his news conference of June 19 at which he said:

We are considering the possibility of a moratorium on tests as part of any arms control agreement. However, as for any unilateral stopping of the tests on our part, I do not think that it would be in our interest.

Finally, the Department of State's letter observed that preparations for opening the talks with the Soviet Union were being considered by the National Security Council and that consequently the Department did not believe that a witness to testify on the resolution would be helpful to the committee.

The Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations held a public hearing on the original resolution on July 16, 1969. The witnesses were Dr. Gordon MacDonald, vice chancellor for research and graduate affairs, University of California at Santa Barbara; Dr. Jack T. Ruina, professor of electrical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. Herbert York, professor of physics, University of California at San Diego. The hearings have been separately printed. In the course of the hearing, Senator Brooke read into the record a portion of a letter from Dr. Freeman Dyson of the Institute for Advanced Study. All three witnesses and Dr. Dyson supported the objectives of the resolution.

Senate Resolution 211 was discussed in an executive session of the Committee on Foreign Relations on October 7, 1969. At that meeting, a revised text of the resolution was presented by Senator Brooke which deleted the resolving clause relating to a declaration of intent by the United States to refrain from additional flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles as long as the Soviet Union also refrained. At the October 7 meeting, some members of the committee expressed a desire to hear Secretary Rogers report on the discussions he had recently held with the Soviet Foreign Minister. Other members of the committee said that they would prefer to hear additional testimony before taking action on the resolution.

The committee met with Secretary Rogers in executive session on October 29, 1969. Secretary Rogers told the committee that the Department of State supported the spirit of the resolution but that he did not think it would be helpful to the SALT talks which were about to begin.

Senate Resolution 211 was discussed again at an executive session of the committee on February 10, 1970. It was the consensus of the members of the committee present that further consideration of the resolution should be related to the administration's plans with regard to the Safeguard system and the relationship of both this question and the MIRV question to the SALT talks.

All of these subjects were discussed at a classified executive session on February 2, 1970, when the committee met with Mr. Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for a briefing on the SALT talks. Soviet and Chinese strategic weapons developments were discussed in a classified executive session on March 2, 1970, at which Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified.

A second public hearing on Senate Resolution 211 was held on March 16, 1970, by the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, which had formerly been called the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs. The witnesses were Senator Brooke and Dr. Marshall Shulman, director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University. In the course of his statement to the subcommittee, Senator Brooke asked that the second resolving clause of the original resolution be amended to include an immediate suspension by the United States and the Soviet Union, of both flight tests and deployment, rather than simply flight tests, of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

The resolution was discussed again in an executive session of the committee on March 20, 1970. Some members of the committee felt that a suspension of both testing and deployment of only multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles would pose certain risks for the United States. Others were of the view that a resolution which called for a suspension of only flight tests, but not deployment, would not be received as a reasonable basis for agreement in light of the fact that the testing program of the United States has proceeded to the point where deployment is imminent while the Soviet Union is apparently not yet in a position to deploy without considerable further testing.

Senator Cooper therefore proposed an amendment to the second resolving clause of the original resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should propose to the Soviet Government an immediate suspension by both Governments of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate. The committee then voted, 10 to 0, to order Senate Resolution 211, incorporating Senator Cooper's amendment, reported favorably to the Senate.

In agreeing to the amendment, the committee decided that the committee report should note specifically that the further deployment of one specific offensive nuclear strategic weapons systems—multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—could most effectively be suspended by stopping further flight tests which are subject to national verification or other measures of observation and inspection. The committee also decided that language in the preliminary clauses should be retained indicating that a suspension of flight tests of such weapons promises to forestall further deployment.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is generally agreed that there is today, as a practical matter, rough parity between the Soviet Union and the United States as far as strategic nuclear weapons are concerned, inasmuch as neither

can destroy the other without risking certain destruction itself. But even though both appear to have a sufficiency of offensive strategic weapons, both are continuing or initiating the deployment of major strategic weapons systems. It would seem, therefore, both feasible and desirable to provide the strategic arms limitation talks with an opportunity to reach agreements without the additional problem of having to take into account a constantly shifting and asymmetrical situation with respect to strategic weapons. The committee believes that an immediate mutual suspension of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, as proposed by this resolution, would provide such an opportunity.

As testimony before the committee has made clear, a suspension of the testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles is an essential element of a more general suspension of further deployment of all offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. But it is also clear, and must be emphasized in this report, that a suspension of testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles could not be sustained for long in the face of the deployment by the Soviet Union of large numbers of missiles, such as the SS-9, or the development and deployment of new strategic defensive systems by the United States or the Soviet Union.

The question naturally arises whether a suspension of the deployment of all offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, which the resolution as reported urges, can be verified. The committee is inclined to the view that a general halt in the deployment of all strategic weapons is more secure against significant evasion than a more limited suspension would be. First of all, it is easier to monitor the strategic activity of an adversary in the context of a general freeze on the deployment of all new weapons than it is to monitor a situation characterized by constant change in the types and numbers of strategic weapons systems involved. Second, given the rough parity which now prevails between the United States and the Soviet Union, far more evasion would be required to provide one party with a significant advantage within the context of a general suspension of the further deployment of all weapons than would be required in the case of a more limited suspension.

The committee recognizes that Senate Resolution 211 is in the nature of advice to the President which he is free to accept or reject. The committee believes, however, that the resolution expresses a growing recognition by the American people that no effort must be spared to bring to an end the escalating cycle of the deployment of nuclear weapons systems—a cycle which threatens all mankind with destruction. The President and our negotiators must determine whether the Soviet Union shares this recognition and whether adequate means can be devised to assure both parties that escalation in these weapons systems can be brought to an end pursuant to the obligation binding on the Soviet and the United States Governments under article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The effect of this resolution is to urge the President to seek an agreement at the outset of negotiations which would freeze this escalation and to indicate that he has the support of the Senate in such efforts. The resolution supplies a clear expression of the belief that the present

time provides an excellent opportunity to prevent the beginning of weapons deployments that will take several years to complete, will in turn inevitably give rise to other weapons systems and will thus complicate the negotiating situation with respect to strategic nuclear weapons, perhaps to the point where meaningful agreements will be impossible. An interim halt would provide an opportunity to avoid this sequence of events. But it is a fleeting opportunity that must be seized now. To this end, the committee recommends the adoption of Senate Resolution 211.

APPENDIX

For the convenience of Members of the Senate, there are printed in this appendix (1) the original resolution (S. Res. 211) as introduced by Senator Brooke for himself and 42 others, (2) the comments of the Department of State on that resolution, and (3) a revised version of Senate Resolution 211 submitted to the committee by Senator Brooke.

These documents were before the committee at the time it amended the original Brooke resolution and reported it favorably, with amendments.

[S. Res. 211, 91st Cong., first sess.]

RESOLUTION

Seeking agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons and the suspension of test flights of reentry vehicles.

Whereas the competition to develop and deploy strategic weapons has reached a new and dangerous phase, which threatens to frustrate attempts to negotiate significant arms limitations and weaken the stability of nuclear deterrence as a barrier to war; and

Whereas development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles by both the United States and the Soviet Union represents a fundamental and radical challenge to such stability; and

Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over strategic forces appears likely to diminish greatly if testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles proceed; and

Whereas a suspension of flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles promises to forestall deployment of such provocative weapons; and

Whereas a suspension of such tests could contribute substantially to the success of prospective strategic arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Government of the United States should seek prompt negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to reach agreement on limiting both offensive and defensive strategic weapons; and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should urgently propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate; and be it further

Resolved, That the Government of the United States should declare its intention to refrain from additional flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles so long as the Soviet Union does so.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., June 24, 1969.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of June 18 requesting executive branch comments on Senate Resolution 210, submitted on June 16, 1969 by Senator Case, and Senate Resolution 211, submitted on June 17, 1969, by Senator Brooke for himself and others.

The executive branch is in accord with both resolutions in supporting the desirability of starting talks with the Soviets on the subject of limitations on strategic weapons. Preparations for these talks are now underway as a matter of highest priority. As the President has indicated, our present target date for opening these talks is July 31, and, as you know, Secretary Rogers has proposed this to the Soviet Ambassador.

When questioned about proposals for suspension of tests at his news conference of June 19, President Nixon said, "We are considering the possibility of a moratorium on tests as part of any arms control agreement. However, as for any unilateral stopping of tests on our part, I do not think that would be in our interest."

We appreciate the constructive efforts by many distinguished members of the Congress in connection with the preparations for the negotiations with the Soviets, and of course will give full and careful consideration to any resolution passed by the Senate.

The preparations for opening the talks are being considered by the National Security Council. As this process goes on and before the negotiations begin, there will be consultation with congressional leaders. In view of these circumstances we do not believe that a Department witness on these resolutions would be helpful to the committee at this time. If, however, there are some additional views which the committee might wish to convey we would, of course, be happy to receive them.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that from the standpoint of the administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

S. Rept. 91-749

REVISED VERSION SUBMITTED TO COMMITTEE BY SENATOR BROOKE

RESOLUTION

Whereas the competition to develop and deploy strategic weapons has reached a new and dangerous phase, which threatens to frustrate attempts to negotiate significant arms limitations and weaken the stability of nuclear deterrence as a barrier to war; and

Whereas development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles by both the United States and the Soviet Union represents a fundamental and radical challenge to such stability; and

Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over strategic forces appears likely to diminish greatly if testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles proceed; and

Whereas a suspension of flight tests of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles promises to forestall deployment of such provocative weapons; and

Whereas a suspension of such tests could contribute substantially to the success of prospective strategic arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union; Now, therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to seek agreed limitations of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons should be urgently pursued; and

Resolved further, that the President of the United States should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of flight tests of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.



S. Rept. 91-749